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Abstract:
In several works, Hartmut Kliemt has developed an original account on the necessity of
rationing health care and on how a rationing policy should be carried out. While I agree
on several important points of that view, there is one important aspect of his account that
I do not ﬁnd plausible: his claim that the so-called ‘acute principle’ (a principle that gives
absolute preeminence to rescuing identiﬁed lives from dying) should be one of the basic
criteria to carry out a rationing policy in a liberal state. After explaining Kliemt’s view
on rationing health care and, more speciﬁcally, the foundations of the acute principle, I
argue that the acute principle is not supported by our basic moral intuitions. I then apply
the previous argument to the case of rationing, arguing for the necessity of a compromise
among intuitions supporting the acute principle and other moral intuitions. Finally, I try
to show that a feasible system of public health care services is conceivable. In doing so, I
make use, with some relevant modiﬁcations, of Kliemt’s own ideas.
1. Introduction
In several works, Hartmut Kliemt has developed an original account on the ne-
cessity of rationing health care and on how a rationing policy should be carried
out.1 I agree on several important points of that view. First, I share Kliemt’s
point that rationing health care should not be considered taboo: state expendi-
tures in health care should be (or will eventually have to be) rationed. I also
think, like him, that rationing should be done according to public, transparent
criteria. Moreover, those criteria should be consistent with the basic moral intui-
tions underlying the liberal, constitutional state. There is, however, one import-
ant aspect of his account that I do not ﬁnd plausible, and in this paper I would
like to focus on that point. I mean his claim that the so-called ‘acute principle’
(a principle that gives absolute preeminence to rescuing identiﬁed lives from dy-
ing) should be one of the basic criteria to carry out a rationing policy in a liberal
state. In section 2, I explain Kliemt’s view on rationing health care and, more
speciﬁcally, the foundations of the acute principle. Then I argue that the acute
principle is not supported by our basic moral intuitions (section 3). In section 4,
1 Kliemt has written extensively on this issue. In this paper I consider only his most recent contri-
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I apply the previous argument to the case of rationing, arguing for the necessity
of a compromise among intuitions supporting the acute principle and other mo-
ral intuitions. In the ﬁnal section, I try to show that a feasible system of public
health care services is conceivable. In doing so, I make use, with some relevant
modiﬁcations, of Kliemt’s own ideas.
2.
Kliemt’s starting point is that rationing health care is unavoidable, given the in-
creasing costs of (meaningful) health care technology. Sooner or later, the state-
ﬁnanced spending in health will have to be cut down (Kliemt 2007, 4; 2006c,
45–50). If this is true, it is better to proceed according to a public, transparent,
and morally justiﬁed criterion rather than according to the private, decentrali-
zed criteria of physicians (Kliemt 2007, 10–11; 2006c, 56–58).
In order to discover an adequate criterion for rationing, Kliemt suggests that
we should change our basic perspective about why the state is morally requi-
red to ﬁnance health care services. According to the common view, the reason is
straightforward: the state ﬁnances those services to fulﬁll the society’s funda-
mental interest on health. Assuming some essential tenets of a liberal perspec-
tive of society, Kliemt claims that the main reason is different: the upholding of
the constitutional state (Kliemt 2006a, 373–376).2
What is the connection between the constitutional state and the warranty
that the state will support some health care services? According to Kliemt, the
connection is symbolic. We, as members of a constitutional state, do not want to
see people die on the street, if we can collectively avoid it.3 In the case of health
care, this symbolic role of the state is supported by what Kliemt calls ‘acute prin-
ciple’ (Akutprinzip): “the more acute and immediate a life threat is, the higher
the social duties of solidarity” (Kliemt 2006a, 370; hereafter all translations are
my own). Kliemt claims that the acute principle is based on our common-sense
distinction between identiﬁed (or concrete) lives and statistical lives: “a concrete
endangered life should not be traded off against other, abstract lives” (Kliemt
2006a, 370). The principle implies two things. It implies, ﬁrst, that measures ai-
med to save concrete endangered lives have preeminence over measures aimed
to save statistical endangered lives. Second, it implies that measures aimed to
save concrete endangered lives have preeminence over measures to save persons
(not from death but) from non lethal illness or disability. Notice that persons un-
dergoing a risk of non-lethal illness can also be concrete: if the state does not
ﬁnance the diabetes treatment of a poor patient, such omission affects a concre-
te, identiﬁed person. However, according to Kliemt, that would not transgress
2 Kliemt uses the term “Rechtsstaat”, which embraces both the idea of the constitutional, liberal
state and the idea of the rule of law. Hereafter I will use the term ‘constitutional state’, ‘liberal
democracy’, and ‘rule of law’ more or less freely and interchangeable.
3 In Kliemt 1993 he argues that a constitutional state and the rule of law is compatible with a
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the acute principle. The acute principle is transgressed only when the state does
not ﬁnance actions oriented to save concrete persons from imminent death.
In Kliemt’s view, the acute principle provides a useful guide to establish a
plausible policy of rationing in health care. According to Kliemt, “acute and
transparency principles are two essential viewpoints of political ethics, which
can serve as guiding viewpoints” (Kliemt 2007, 15; see also 2006b, 41). More
speciﬁcally, “the acute principle offers a general answer to the question concer-
ning the distinction between what we should consider as basic provision and
supplementary provision” (Kliemt 2006b, 42). Basic health services, guaranteed
by the state, should be assigned to fulﬁll the moral demand of rescuing people
from imminent death.
Before asking more carefully about the connection between the acute princi-
ple and the rule of law, it must be stressed that, according to Kliemt, the acute
principle is not sufﬁcient. On the one hand, other conditions are necessary, for
example, transparency. On the other, even if we follow the acute principle, fur-
ther rationing measures may well be necessary in the future. For example, dia-
lysis is a life-saving technology and should therefore be offered unconditionally,
according to the acute principle. However, it may well be the case that dialysis
(or other expensive) measures will have to be curtailed in the future, for instan-
ce, giving preeminence to younger patients over older ones (see Kliemt 2006a,
375; 2006b, 42).
The acute principle and the corresponding (and more abstract) principle of
preeminence of identiﬁed lives over statistical lives are, in an important sense,
irrational. Kliemt acknowledges this (Kliemt 2006a, 373), insofar as we take
these principles as guiding a health care policy seeking the maximization of
health in society. However, if our goal is not maximizing health but stabilizing
or reinforcing the rule of law, then those principles may become rational.
Why does guaranteeing some health services according to the acute principle
support the stability of the constitutional state? Kliemt is not quite clear on this
point. The acceptance of the acute principle and the preeminence of identiﬁed
over statistical lives, says Kliemt, is “universal” among citizens of west demo-
cracies (Kliemt 2006a, 369). This widespread view seems to be connected to the
“acknowledgment of the preeminent value of individual life” (Kliemt 2006a, 374;
see also 2007, 9).
One interpretation of Kliemt’s view is that the acute principle reﬂects an
agent-relative reason to rescue imminently endangered lives. There would be
a deontological constraint against letting people die. A legitimate liberal state
would be required to honor such individual (non-aggregative) right to be saved.
In the same way as we are not allowed to kill one person to save others, the acute
principle would claim that we cannot let one identiﬁed life die in order to save
other, statistical, ones. The same agent-relative principle would forbid us to let
one identiﬁed person die to prevent many (identiﬁed or statistical) persons from
suffering a non-lethal illness.
However, this strong interpretation does not seem to be Kliemt’s view. When
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goal is the preservation of the constitutional state, what he is suggesting is this:
Because most people (irrationally) endorse the acute principle, a state’s not in-
cluding a set of life-saving policies (among others, a health care policy for life-
threatening conditions) would appear to those people as not respecting the int-
rinsic value of individual lives and, therefore, the stability of the constitutional
state would be undermined. Kliemt’s argument is therefore consequentialist, not
deontological. This is not an objection in itself, but we should stress the fact that
this argument founds the public approval of the acute principle on an irrational
belief held by most individual people. It is not irrational to support the public
enactment of the acute principle, but the argument is indirect: we are interested
in the preservation of the constitutional state and, given the (irrational) beliefs
of people, such enactment is instrumentally efﬁcient to achieve that goal.
Kliemt’s view sounds therefore somehow paradoxical, but it is not inconsis-
tent. In an ideal world, it is irrational for any individual person to endorse the
acute principle as a public policy. If her interest is to maximize her individual
health, she should support a public policy oriented to maximize general health
and not one guided by the acute principle. In the real world, a rational (more
sophisticated) person would make the following two-steps argument: I am inte-
rested in maximizing my own health. But I am also interested in preserving the
liberal, constitutional state. This interest is more important than the ﬁrst one
(among other reasons, because without a constitutional state I would not enjoy
health care either). Given the irrational beliefs of most people, enacting a pu-
blic policy that maximizes general health would erode the liberal, constitutional
state. Therefore, I support a public policy guided by the acute principle.
Since the argument is consequentialist, the connection between the acute
principle and the stability of the constitutional state must be an empirical, cau-
sal one. As such, it should be supported by empirical (statistical) evidence about
the moral intuitions of ordinary people, about the connection between those mo-
ral intuitions and the stability of the constitutional state, and so on. Kliemt does
not provide such kind of evidence. The discussion is therefore speculative. In
the same speculative vein, I argue in the next section that the acute principle is
not supported by our basic moral intuitions, including our moral intuition that
resources should not be allocated in an extremely irrational way. We have, of
course, strong intuitions in favor of saving people’s lives, but we have also strong
intuitions against letting people suffer signiﬁcant diseases or impairments.
3.
Let us then consider to what extent the acute principle is supported by our moral
intuitions. I understand here moral intuitions in the restrictive sense of those
moral beliefs that normal citizens share, such that ignoring those beliefs might
incline people to ﬁnd the political system illegitimate and, therefore, erode the
stability of the constitutional state. I assume that such intuitions, as Kliemt
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over aggregative considerations. However, I think our moral intuitions do not
support an unqualiﬁed preeminence of the duty to rescue people from death. We
have competing intuitions that require a more complex and nuanced picture. To
show this, I will brieﬂy consider some cases.
Let us ﬁrst focus on diagnosis and prevention. Kliemt claims that “the conse-
quent application of the acute principle implies, for example, that preventive me-
dicine, as well as wide performed screening, should be eliminated from the list
of measures to be guaranteed by the state” (Kliemt 2006b, 42). Kliemt manages
to include vaccines (the most typical preventive medical measure) into the ba-
sic service-package by regarding them as public goods (Kliemt 2006a, 376). I will
not dispute this point, although it is not entirely clear to me that vaccination can
be classiﬁed as a public good in the full sense of the word.4 Letting aside the case
of vaccines, there is a wide range of diagnostic and preventive measures, which
may well have legitimate preeminence over some life-rescuing ones. I will offer
just one example. In developed countries, every newborn’s blood is tested for at
least two diseases: phenylketonuria (PKU) and neonatal hypothyroidism. These
are genetic diseases, which are devastating without early diagnosis, but almost
without consequences with early diagnosis and proper treatment. Kliemt’s de-
fense of the acute principle implies that this diagnostic practice, as well as the
consequent treatment, should be outside the medical measures guaranteed by
the state. That means that a poor person, without access to health insurance
or economic means for diagnose and treatment of these diseases, would remain
uncovered. Although these diseases produce serious health impairments, they
are not imminently lethal. According to Kliemt, our moral intuitions prevent us
from allowing a person die, but they do not prevent us from allowing a person
undergoing these devastating harms. Although diagnosis and treatment of the-
se conditions are not particularly expensive,5 the sum of resources spent in all
these kinds of measures could be applied in life-rescuing measures, increasing
the number of identiﬁed people saved.
Now think on the paradoxical situation we are led to by accepting the acute
principle as a guideline for health care spending. A poor person born with PKU
will not be diagnosed and treated. However, after some years of suffering this
devastating disease, when that person is about to die precisely from this condi-
tion,6 all kinds of expensive medical means will be offered in order to save or
prolong her life. Nobody can, after reﬂection, agree to that policy.
4 At least it is not a public good in its pure form. Pure public goods generate a free-rider problem.
In a free-rider situation the rational person prefers general defection to being the only cooperator
(I prefer that everyone throws away garbage on the street to being the only one not doing so).
This is because, if I am the only cooperator I do not obtain the good (I walk anyway on dirty
streets). Instead, in the case of vaccines, the rational person would prefer being the only one
getting vaccinated to general defection. I am not sure to what extent this difference amount to a
proof that vaccination is not a public good, but I think it is a relevant difference.
5 Both conditions are easily discovered with a blood test. The treatment is a strict diet in the case
of PKU, and a replacement therapy with thyroxine in the case of neonatal hypothyroidism.
6 PKU children have, among other things, increased risk of heart problems.436 Eduardo Rivera-López
The same point could be extended to the treatment of many chronic disea-
ses like diabetes or cancer. Citizens of a liberal democracy are not prepared to
see how other citizens deteriorate just because they cannot afford a treatment
against diabetes. In the case of health services during pregnancy and infancy
this is still more apparent. We are not going to let a pregnant woman give birth
at home, just because she cannot pay a hospital, even if giving birth at home is
not life threatening (it is just more risky).
The point of these examples is not to prove that it is irrational to invest
health care resources following the acute principle. The point is, rather, that
we have competing intuitions. It is not obvious that our intuition for saving a
person from imminent death will always overthrow our intuitions for preventing
a person from having a non-lethal but serious disease. If this is the case, it is not
clear that the acute principle is a good guide for rationing health care. In the
next section, I show this more carefully.
4.
In this paper, I am neutral about the wider philosophical question of whether
it is a function of the liberal state to strive for a general improvement of the
health conditions of people. Whatever our position on this issue might be, it
seems relatively indisputable that one essential function of a liberal state is the
maintenance and reinforcement of the constitution and the rule of law. This is
Kliemt’s starting point and I assume it. I will now argue that, if my argument in
the previous section is sound, a plausible account of rationing will have to ﬁnd
a compromise between competing intuitions. Let me mention three reasons for
thinking that such a compromise is necessary.
As my previous argument shows, we have both the intuition that people in
imminent risk of death should be saved and that people suffering non-trivial
diseases should be diagnosed and treated. We do not want to see people dying
on the street. But we neither want to see people suffering preventable illness on
the street. It might be that the ﬁrst intuition is stronger, but it is not inﬁnitely
stronger. At some point, we are ready to sacriﬁce life-rescuing spending in favor
of illness-rescuing spending. Otherwise, the same kind of erosion of the liberal
state will take place. I agree that failing to rescue people from death may under-
mine the stability of the rule of law. But failing to ‘rescue’ people from serious
disease, or hunger, or homelessness may also have such destabilizing effect, even
if those conditions are not imminently lethal. The balance of these destabilizing
effects is not easy to make, but I see no reason to think that it will always tip in
favor of life-rescuing measures.
A second point is connected to the fact that, as we have seen, the acute prin-
ciple is collectively irrational, if each individual person wants to maximize her
own health. Note that this is independent from the issue of rationing. Whether
rationing is necessary or not, public health care expenditures can be invested
more efﬁciently by following a compromise between life-rescuing measures andRationing Health Care and the Role of the ‘Acute Principle’ 437
illness-rescuing ones than by following the acute principle alone. From a certain
threshold of irrationality on, irrationality becomes morally counterintuitive. If
the state guarantees increasingly expensive life-saving treatments (like trans-
plants, helicopters, etc.) but does not guarantee elementary diagnosis and treat-
ment against infections, coronary conditions, diabetes, etc., at some point the
situation would become so irrational that people, I speculate, will have a lapse
of rationality and understand the plausibility of cutting some life-rescuing mea-
sures in favor of other measures that increase the number of statistic lives or
the health condition of people.
A third reason to defend a compromise is the following. As we have seen,
Kliemt acknowledges that the acute principle is (or will be) insufﬁcient as a ra-
tioning criterion. Life-saving measures are also increasingly expensive and will
eventually have to be cut down. Will this fact threaten the stability of the liberal
state? It might be, to some extent. In any case, cutting down some more life-
saving measures in order to preserve some meaningful health care services does
not seem to be essentially more threatening. A sensible compromise between
life-saving and illness-saving measures seem more stabilizing than an unquali-
ﬁed preeminence of life-saving measures, which will anyway have to be cut down
as well.
All this suggests that, even if cutting down some life-rescuing measures
might, to some degree, affect the stability of the rule of law, there is no reason to
think that cutting down some diagnostic, preventive or curative measures will
not have the same effect. To some degree, every rationing of health care (at least
concerning serious conditions) will have a destabilizing effect. It seems that ra-
tioning according to a compromise between life-rescuing and illness-rescuing
measures will more likely minimize such negative effect.
5.
Still, we might defend the acute principle by claiming that it offers at least a
clear-cut distinction between basic and non-basic services. If we instead try to
ﬁnd a compromise between life-rescuing and illness-rescuing services, the list of
guaranteed services would be indeterminate, and this would affect transparency
and publicity. However, I think this is not the case. Let me ﬁnish by showing how
a transparent system of guaranteed health care services could include services
for life-threatening conditions as well as preventive measures and treatment of
diseases. To do so, I will follow one of Kliemt’s ideas, with some minor adjust-
ments. Let me ﬁrst quote Kliemt’s proposal at length:
“The obligation to have health insurance is abolished. Each citizen
has the responsibility to ensure herself against health risks. Those
uninsured must face the ﬁnancial consequences of illness up to the
point where they start to be covered by the social welfare. There is,
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to), no public insurance against the ﬁnancial risk of illness. Howe-
ver, there is a public guarantee that nobody in acute health or life
emergency will be left unattended only because she cannot pay. If
a citizen in an acute emergency situation can be helped with medi-
cal measures, the state is ready to advance funds for the respective
services. There is a state guarantee for that. However, the state will
require the devolution of the credit. Inasmuch as there are assets
above the social welfare level, the citizen must pay, unless she has
contracted an insurance for that payment.” (Kliemt 2006a, 378)
Consider now the following modiﬁcation of the system envisioned by Kliemt. In-
stead of guaranteeing services only for those conditions that are acute life or
health emergencies, the state guarantees services of an average health insuran-
ce, which typically includes much more than emergency or life-saving measu-
res (it includes prevention, diagnosis, and treatment both for acute and chronic
diseases), and, at the same time, does not necessarily includes every possible
life-saving measure.
Such a system would certainly be more expensive. But notice the two followi-
ng points. First, the state will have to face those costs only in the case of people
that are close to the level of social welfare. As Kliemt rightly says, everyone abo-
ve that level will have a strong incentive to have a private health insurance,
since she will by liable for those costs. Without health insurance, every non-poor
person facing a non-trivial health problem would be ﬁnancially ruined. Second,
the health care budget would not increase indeﬁnitely. That budget would be
rationed according to the same criterion that an average non-poor individual
citizen uses to choose a health insurance in the free market. That person will
not necessarily buy a health insurance with access to every meaningful treat-
ment and technology, including every life-saving measure. The premium would,
at some point, start to be unbearable or unreasonable. In my model, the state
would mimic a rational, average person and guarantee those services that such
a person would have access to, given the current costs of medical technology. Mo-
reover, I insist, those services would be offered for free only to those persons who
have not contracted a health insurance and cannot afford the cost of treatment.
My purpose in suggesting this alternative is not to defend it as a plausible
health care system. In fact, I have objections to it.7 My purpose is just to show
that there is a viable system of guaranties for health care that incorporates ma-
ny (but not all possible) life-rescuing medical measures, as well as many (but
not all possible) diagnostic and treatment measures for serious, non-lethal con-
ditions. If my arguments in the previous section are plausible, there are reasons
to think that such a system will be less detrimental to the stability of the liberal
democracy than Kliemt’s proposal.
7 My objections are based on considerations of justice. But they are irrelevant for my purpose here.Rationing Health Care and the Role of the ‘Acute Principle’ 439
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